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ABSTRACT
With the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT), the ever
growing number of connected devices observed in recent
years and foreseen for the next decade suggests that more
and more data will have to be transmitted over a network, be-
fore being processed and stored in data centers. Generalized
deduplication (GD) is a novel technique to effectively reduce
the data storage cost by identifying similar data chunks, and
able to gradually reduce the pressure from the network in-
frastructure by limiting the data that needs to be transmitted.
This paper presents Hermes, an application-level proto-
col for the data-plane that can operate over generalized
deduplication, as well as over classic deduplication. Her-
mes significantly reduces the data transmission traffic while
effectively decreasing the energy footprint, a relevant mat-
ter to consider in the context of IoT deployments. We fully
implemented Hermes and evaluated its performance using
consumer-grade IoT devices (e.g., Raspberry Pi 4B models).
Our results highlight several trade-offs that must be taken
into account when considering real-world workloads.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The increasing adoption and expansion of Internet of Things
(IoT) technologies is leading to an correspondingly growing
number of connected, low-energy yet efficient and powerful
Internet-enabled devices. Predictions [10] indicate 175 ZB of
data being produced by IoT devices already by 2025, with
up to 1.25 Billion units deployed by 2030 [9] and 38% of
the global IP-based traffic generated by mobile devices [8].
Despite the imminent introduction of wider-band wireless
technologies (e.g., 5G and beyond), it is clear that the pressure
on the network will continue to increase.
Data compression [19], deduplication [22] or network cod-
ing (NC) techniques [36] have been proposed to solve these
IoT problems. The latter is particularly interesting given the
unreliable nature of data streams commonly found in real-
world IoT deployments [3]. NC introduces redundancywhere
needed to protect against data loss, i.e., efficient protection of
data. On the other hand, compression and deduplication are
interesting given the compression potential of IoT-generated
data (e.g., smart power meters [24], weather stations [13],
bio-medical body sensors [6]).
To validate this hypotesis, we applied different compres-
sion algorithms to a real-world dataset from the domain of
ambient water and energy [1, 4]. Figure 1 shows that there
is a high potential to reduce data transmission (original size
divided by compressed size - higher is better).
The main challenge of standard compression algorithms
in IoT is related to their processing costs [11, 26]. Efficient
compressors are usually too computationally intensive and
memory-eager for IoT devices, while lightweight, memory-
efficient approaches tend to have poorer compression per-
formance [33, 40, 41].
An added challenge is that many IoT applications rely on
small data packets and compress data on a per packet basis due
to memory limitations, which curbs the compression poten-
tial of standard compressors [37]. In fact, Figure 1 shows that
the compression ratio for two standard compression algo-
rithms LZW [34] and DEFLATE [11] decreases dramatically
for smaller chunk lengths.
Network deduplication [31] is a well-known technique to
reduce network traffic. It operates by replacing a repeating
byte sequence with a shorter hash value, which is later used
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Figure 1: Compression ratio for the real world data set, water meter measurements, under different algorithms.
to identify the intended content by the receiving side. Sanad-
hya et al. [30] proposed asymmetric caching, where a source
node performs deduplication on the outgoing chunks of data
based on its cache content and the sink node’s feedback, simi-
lar to what was originally done onWeb caches in [31]. A sink
node sends timely feedback to the source node containing
selected portion of its cache that is most likely to be useful
to increase the probability of matching. For instance, [39]
describes a deduplication-based file communication system
that leverage manifest feedback. The source node splits each
file into chunks and associated hash values. Then, it checks
locally for duplication based on its cache. In case of misses,
the hash values of missing duplicates are sent to the sink
node for further duplication detection. The feedback packets
from the sink node include the query information and the
manifests of the chunks that have been hit at the sink node.
The manifests are the hash values, addresses and sizes of the
chunks. In [18] a traffic deduplication approach is proposed
to merge independent streams of the same video content on
the Internet using a novel overlay network.
An enabled router can then merge and assign an identifier
to each video. In case of a match of video identifiers, the
router will handle the merge. The described approaches are
typically designed for point-to-point transmission scenarios
and using large data chunks, large hashes, local caching, and
operating on files with data known a priori.
For IoT applications generating smaller data chunks on
the fly (i.e., the nature of data is not known beforehand)
and limited memory/computation, existing state-of-the-art
approaches are not suitable to deliver energy- and memory-
efficient protocols. Furthermore, a large source of compres-
sion potential in IoT comes from the massive amount of data
sources compared to a standard approach, which needs to
be considered in the system’s design.
Another limitation of the state-of-the-art is that compres-
sion is provided by finding only equal data chunks. If two
chunks differ in even one bit value, they will be considered
two different chunks.
Although techniques such as Rabin fingerprinting [29] can
be used to split data in non-uniform chunks (i.e., different
sizes) to detect similarities, these require significant added
computation and memory to hold the computed similarity
hashes. This makes the approach unsuitable for the IoT.
Generalized deduplication (GD) [32] (further detailed in
§2) is a recently introduced scheme reduce the cost of storage
not only by finding equal data chunks, but also by finding sim-
ilar data chunks. As in other lossless compression schemes,
similarities between chunks are identified without the need
to carry out delta compression to a pool of previous chunks
and without relying on similarity hashes for dynamic chunk-
ing. The latter would be impractical for the small amount
of generated data in IoT devices. In [37], a lossless, multi-
source data transmission compression approach inspired by
the concept of GD was proposed to reduce the amount of
data transmission. Figure 1 shows the compression ratio for
data deduplication (DD) and GD, showing that GD has the
potential to outperform DD in IoT scenarios, but also that
GD outperform LZW and DEFLATE for small packet sizes.
This paper introduces Hermes, a protocol and a corre-
sponding complete implementation for data transmission
reduction in sensor networks, especially suited for resource-
limited data nodes. Its design principles are inspired by
the schemes proposed in [37], but also expanding this ap-
proach as well as making judicious adaptations to tackle core
implementation and system aspects. Hermes allows multi-
ple sources to share a common (and growing) data pool at
the sink node, typically a Cloud- or Edge-based device. All
source transmissions contribute to growing the knowledge
pool. Thus, spatial data correlations across multiple sources
(e.g., similar temperature data at the same time across the
same city, similar smart metering consumption of several
households) as well as temporal correlations across multi-
ple sources (e.g., same electricity readings of house A today
as house B a year ago) can be exploited for reducing data
transmission and allow for better compression at the sink
node. Each device then benefits from contributions from
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other devices in order to reduce their traffic. Hermes per-
forms this without direct interactions between devices. We
implemented and experimentally evaluated Hermes’ perfor-
mance with micro- and macro-benchmarks on Raspberry
Pi 4B. In the best case scenario, we show reductions of 3
orders of magnitude of GD over DD, but also over per packet
compression using LZW and DEFLATE.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, we
introduce a theoretical background on generalized dedupli-
cation. In §3, we study different communication mechanisms
based on GD. The Hermes system and protocol is detailed
in §4. The experimental setup and the results of our exper-
imental evaluation are presented in §5. We survey related
work in §6. Finally, Section 7 concludes and presents future
directions.
2 BACKGROUND
We begin by giving basic definitions and notations that are
used throughout the rest of paper.
2.1 Fingerprints and data deduplication
We define f (.) a function that associates a (nearly) unique
fingerprint to its input, either using standard hash functions,
e.g., SHA-1, SHA-256, or checksums, e.g., CRC32, MD5. A
deployment of Hermes should settle on a specific f (.) based
on the need of low collision probability, i.e., for two different
inputs to match the same fingerprint, but also the size of the
fingerprint in relation to the amount of data transmitted per
packet. We note as well that the resulting compression gains
are partially related (and limited) by the latter. For example,
a payload of 40 bytes using a SHA-1 fingerprint of 20 bytes
will not compress beyond a factor of 2. Our evaluation shows
the trade-offs for different f (.) options.
Data deduplication (DD) eliminates redundant data, re-
moving copies of repeating data chunks.
Classic DD divides each piece of data into multiple data
chunks,Ci , and stores each unique data chunk only once, by
distinguishing between repeating data patterns and saving
those only once. A fingerprint is linked to each chunk. Each
file or piece of data would then be represented as a sequence
of fingerprints for each of its chunks. To recover the original
data, one only needs to search for the chunk associated to
each fingerprint and concatenate the data in the right order.
2.2 Generalized deduplication
Generalized deduplication (GD) [32] is a lossless data com-
pression approach. It operates by eliminating equal as well
as similar data chunks. This is achieved without comparing
directly to previous chunks, but rather using a transforma-
tion function to systematically cluster similar data. GD splits
each piece of data into a series of equal-sized smaller chunks
Ci ’s and maps each chunk, Ci , onto a pair of basis, bi , and
associated deviation, di , by applying a transformation func-
tion. For the transformation function, an error-correcting
code (ECC) can be used. Each basis bi , which is larger than
di ", is assigned a fingerprint, f (bi ). The basis is saved only
once. For simplicity, we use the notation fbi instead of f (bi ).
Rather than saving Ci , GD stores a pair fbi and di . Note that
DD can be considered as a special case of GD where there is
no deviation, di = 0, and bi = Ci .
GD Example. Consider a chunk as having a shape and a
color. In this case, DD would provide a fingerprint for each
chunk A with color cA and shape sA. GD can define a trans-
formation that would split the chunk into the pair (sA, cA)
and proceed to deduplicate based on sA only. That is, GD
deduplicates all fragments that have the same shape sA, since
shape is bigger and requires more bits to be represented. Each
shape (our basis) will have a unique fingerprint. The color
information is simpler and requires few bits to represent it.
We will keep the color cA in the description of the data, next
to the fingerprint pointing to the description of the shape.
Recovering the chunk involves fetching details about the
shape (basis) and then apply the correct color (deviation).
Naturally, this increases the chances of mapping data with
similar information (same shape). In general, these are sim-
ply bit sequences and the matching potential depends on the
transformation that splits into basis-deviation pairs.
2.3 GD for efficient data transmission
GD can also reduce data transmission in a lossless man-
ner [37]. The idea is to apply GD at the source node to send
the basis only if not available at the sink node (e.g., Cloud,
Edge device). At the source node, e.g., a sensor node, each
chunk of data Ci is then mapped onto a pair (bi ,di ). To re-
duce network overhead, the source node first transmits the
associated basis fingerprint, fbi , e.g., a hash common to all
the source nodes, and the deviation di . The sink node checks
whether it has the basis for the basis fingerprint or not. If the
basis for the basis fingerprint is already available at the sink
node, it saves the data and sends back an acknowledgement.
At this point, the source node erases the associated basis
and deviation from its memory. Otherwise, the sink node
sends a basis request and the source node sends the basis
itself. When receiving the acknowledgement from the sink,
the source erases the basis from its memory.
This process can be generalized to transmit the infor-
mation about more chunks in a single packet. Notice that
all source nodes leverage the same hash function, each of
them exploits all basis fingerprints available at the sink node,
whether they were generated by the same source node or
another source node.
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We study possible communication mechanisms based on
DD and GD in section 3.
2.4 Transformation functions
A variety of functions exist to create the mapping from Ci
to (bi ,di ). We rely on error-correcting codes (ECC):Ci is the
codeword and, by applying the decoding function of the ECC,
the received message is the basis. The deviation di carries
the information about the difference between the codeword
and the error-free codeword. The latter is created by encoding
the basis bi using the ECC encoding function.
Hamming codes. Hamming codes [23] are a valid family
of linear ECCs that can be used for the considered map-
ping [25]. Letm be the number of parity bits, then the code-
word and the message are of length n = 2m − 1 bits and
k = 2m −m − 1 bits, respectively. We also define nB = ⌈n8 ⌉
and kB = ⌈k8 ⌉ as the byte-length of the codeword and mes-
sage, respectively.
Hamming codes can correct one bit errors. In our con-
text, this means that codewords are at most one bit away
from the error-free codewords. That is, we will systemati-
cally match chunks to others that have one bit difference,
without comparing to previously received data chunks. The
location of the bit is specified in a syndrome vector of length
m bits. Thus,m bits are enough to represent the deviation
for Hamming codes. Since Hamming is a binary code, where
a non-zero value must be a 1, there is no need to save the
content of the one bit error. By applying Hamming codes as
the transformation function, all chunks mapped to a given
basis are at most one bit away from the error-free chunk.
Note that n = 2m − 1, which would not use at least the last
bit in the last byte. Given the specific structure of Hamming
codes, we consider chunks of length n + 1 bits to represent
data received in bytes. The Hamming transformation is per-
formed in the first n bits. The remaining bit is left untouched
as part of the deviation (concatenated with them deviation
bits). Thus, the resulting deviation for chunks of size n + 1
bits would bem + 1 bits in total. During recovery, the steps
is undone and the additional bit is appended to the n bits.
Reed-Solomon codes.Reed-Solomon codes [35] are valid
ECCs to use for creating the mapping [32]. Reed-Solomon
codes operate on a block of data treated as a series of sym-
bols from a finite field of size q, Fq . A RSq(nB ,kB ) is a Reed-
Solomon code where q specifies the finite field that sym-
bols are from, Fq , and nB and kB are the symbol-size of the
codeword and message, respectively, where nB = q − 1 and
kB < nB . t = ⌊ nB−kB2 ⌋ is the error correction capability of
the code. For q = 256, symbols are 8 bits in length (a byte).
Using a short version of the code [23], nB is more flexible,
i.e., kB < nB < q.
Table 1: Covering radius of few Reed-Solomon Codes.
Code R(C)
RS256(16, 14) 2
RS256(255, 253) 2
RS256(255, 247) 8
RS256(64, 56) 11
The deviation can be computed by a bitwise XOR of the
original chunk and the error-free chunk. Then, the deviation
is the location and the content of the non-zero symbols of
the resulting sequence of the XOR. Using these codes, it is
impossible to predict a deviation as in Hamming codes. It
is however possible to specify the maximum length of the
intended deviation. To achieve this, we consider the covering
radius metric of the code, R(C). R(C) is the largest Hamming
distance that any chunk might be from the associated error-
free codeword. Covering radius of a few Reed-Solomon codes
are shown in Table 1.
Thus, we will need a maximum number of bits for repre-
senting the location and content of non-zero symbols given
by R(C).⌈log2 nB⌉ bits and R(C).⌈log2 q⌉ bits, respectively.
2.5 Preprocessing
After splitting each piece of data into a series of equal-sized
(and smaller) chunks Ci ’s, but before applying a transfor-
mation function for mapping, we can apply an additional
step to enhance the compression. In this context, we think
specifically on time-series and/or sensor data that contains
a number of samples. These samples could be from different
sensors within the device (e.g., speed, vibrations, tempera-
ture) and/or for the same sensor over time.
Delta encodingwithin a data packet.Considering each
chunkCi as a concatenation of samples, applying delta encod-
ing keeps the first sample unchanged and following samples
will be replaced by the difference between the current sample
and the previous one.
Note that we consider delta encoding to be performed
within each data packet and not across data packets. This
can reduce the range of the data (variance) if samples have
constant or small variation. The reduction in the data range
can increase the matching probability of the bases. On the
other hand, delta encoding can increase by one bit (the sign)
the required number of bits to represent the data samples.
For example, a 3-byte sample 128, 127, 128 would encode to
128,−1, 1.
Offset removal within a data packet. To reduce the
range of data and to keep the number of bits per sample
unchanged, we propose the idea of offset removal. Let us con-
sider each chunk Ci as a concatenation of samples. We de-
termine the minimum sample value of each chunk Ci . Then,
by applying offset removal, each sample can be represented
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Figure 2: Communication mechanisms.
as the differential value between the current sample and the
minimum value of the chunk. We save the minimum value
as part of the associated deviation (i.e., we increase the devia-
tion by an additional value). The 3-byte sample 128, 127, 128
would then encode to 1, 0, 1 with a minimum value of 127
added to the deviation.
3 COMMUNICATION MECHANISMS
We devise three different communication mechanisms on
top of GD, depicted in Figure 2.
For each of themwe describe the trade-offs and advantages
with respect to DD.
Baseline deduplication (DD): Figure 2 (a) presents the
baseline mechanism on top of DD .
Each fingerprint corresponds to a unique chunk value
(with high probability given the fingerprint function).
Baseline gen. deduplication (GD-vanilla):
A similar mechanism can be operated on top of GD, as
shown in Figure 2 (b). Notice that DD and GD-vanilla use
the same fingerprint length. Thus, GD-vanilla may incur a
slightly larger overhead than DD if an exact duplicate chunk
is already in the sink node, since the transmission of the
deviation would be redundant.
Reducedfingerprint gen. deduplication (GD-reduced):
Figure 2 (c) shows a variant that compensates the overhead
of GD-vanilla . Since the bases for GD have fewer bits than
the chunk length, we can consider a slightly smaller finger-
print for GD. In GD-reduced, we design the system such
that the length of the fingerprint plus the deviation is equal
to the length of the fingerprint for DD. This removes the
penaltywhen transmitting exact duplicates, albeit potentially
compromising the probability of collision of the fingerprint,
i.e., having a larger probability of two different bases being
mapped to the same fingerprint.
Dual fingerprint generalised deduplication (GD-dual):
Finally, we describe a hybrid approach that allows the sink
to identify whether it sees an exact replica or a new chunk
potentially associated to a previously seen basis. As shown
in Figure 2 (d), this approach transmits the fingerprint of
the chunk, f ′ci , and of the basis, f
′
bi
, at the same time. We set
each of these as half length of fci of the classic DD approach.
If the chunk is already available in the sink node (receiver),
the sink sends an acknowledgement. Otherwise, it checks
if the basis has been received. If it is already available, the
sink node sends a request for deviation. Else, the sink sends
a request for the chunk. After receiving the deviation or
the chunk, the sink node sends back an acknowledgement.
Notice that the probability of collision is equal for both com-
munication mechanisms DD and GD-dual. This is due to the
fact that the total fingerprint length in bits of DD is the same
as the total length the two fingerprints (e.g., calculated with
the same algorithm and only sending a fraction of the bits).
Notice that if a given chunk is already available at the sink
node, both f ′bi and f
′
ci should match. On the other hand, if
a similar chunk matches to the same basis, f ′bi will match,
but not f ′ci . However, it is possible to calculate the chunk’s
fingerprint locally, due to availability of both basis and devia-
tion to make sure it matches the received f ′ci . Thus, GD-dual
provides a lower probability of collision than GD-reduced
and equivalent to DD and GD-vanilla.
3.1 Transmission cost
DD and GDD schemes have different transmission (i.e., net-
work) costs.
The parameterC denotes the total number of chunks trans-
mitted by the source. Let us define BGD and BDD as the total
number of different bases generated by a source node out
of C data chunks by using GD and DD, respectively, where
a “basis” for DD is equal to the chunk itself (§2.1). We also
define dB (i) and hB,P as the deviation byte length ofCi and a
basis fingerprint’s byte length for the scheme P, respectively.
Accordingly, the transmission cost TP(C) for a source node
depends on the scheme P where,
TDD (C) = BDD · nB +
C∑
i=1
hB,DD [bytes], (1)
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TGD−van .(C) = BGD ·kB+
C∑
i=1
(
hB,GD−van .+dB (i)
) [bytes],
TGD−r ed .(C) = BGD ·kB +
C∑
i=1
(
hB,GD−r ed . +dB (i)
) [bytes],
TGD−dual (C) = BGD ·nB+
∑
i ∈Q
dB (i)+
C∑
i=1
hB,GD−dual [bytes],
and Q is the set of chunks for which there is no exact chunk
at the sink, but for which there is a basis, i.e., where GD could
find a match that is not an exact one. The total number of
elements inQ is BDD −BGD . We consider∑Ci=1 (hB,GD−r ed .+
dB (i)
)
=
∑C
i=1 hB,DD and hB,DD = hB,GD−van . = hB,GD−dual ,
where hB,GD−dual is the addition length of f ′bi and f
′
ci . Con-
sidering C · nB as the original size of data, we calculate the
compression ratio as C ·nBTP .
Notice that
TDD (C) < C · nB ⇒ BDD < nB − hB,DD
nB
·C .
We can now calculate the conditions for which GD will
outperform DD for the different schemes as follows.
GD-vanilla: For GD-vanilla to outperform DD, we as-
sume:
TGD−van .(C) < TDD (C) ⇒
BGD < BDD · nB −
∑C
i=1 dB (i)
kB
.
(2)
We consider MGD = C − BGD andMDD = C − BDD as
the total number of matches for GD and DD, respectively,
out of C data chunks. Using Equation 2, we can determine
that GD-vanilla outperforms DD if:
(C −MGD ) · kB +
C∑
i=1
dB (i) < (C −MDD ) · nB ⇒∑C
i=1 dB (i) +C · (kB − nB ) +MDD · nB
kB
< MGD
For the cases where
∑C
i=1 dB (i)+C ·kB = C ·nB , GD-vanilla
outperforms DD if the number of matches for GD is greater
than nBkB times the number of matches for DD. Notice that
the number of matches for GD is always equal or greater
than the number of matches for DD.
GD-reduced: Using a similar analysis, we can determine
that GD-reduced always improves the transmission cost
compared to DD, because kB < nB and
∑C
i=1
(
hB,GD−r ed . +
dB (i)
)
=
∑C
i=1 hB,DD .
GD-dual: By replacing BDD with BGD + (BDD − BGD ) in
Equation 1 and considering that for any i , dB (i) < nB , shows
that GD-dual reduces the transmission cost compared to DD
in all scenarios.
Example. For nB = 128, nk = 127, hB = 20 and C =
1000000, DD reduces the transmission cost ifMDD > 156250.
If
∑C
i=1 dB (i)+C ·kB = C ·nB , GD-vanilla outperforms DD as
long asMGD > 1.00787MDD which means GD should have
at least 1231morematches. However if
∑C
i=1 dB (i)
C +kB−nB = 1
then GD-vanilla outperforms DD ifMGD > 1.00787MDD +
7874.01 which means GD should have at least 9105 more
matches compared to DD.
3.2 Compression ratio
As shown in Figure 1, we achieve different compression ratio
for LZW, DEFLATE [11], DD and the various GD variants
over a real-world data for different chunk lengths.
All schemes are applied over the data at byte level. We
consider 6-byte fingerprints (hB,DD = 6) andHamming codes
as the transformation.
We observe that GD-reduced and GD-dual (with or with-
out offset removal) outperform LZW, DEFLATE and DD for
chunk lengths of 16, 64 and 128 bytes. For large chunk length
of 256 B, DEFLATE provides better compression ratio com-
pared to other schemes while our techniques outperform
LZW and DD with gains of up to 1.41× and 1.48×, respec-
tively. GD-vanilla with offset removal provides up to 1.4×
and 1.05× better compression ratio compared to DD for
chunk lengths of 256 and 128 B, respectively.
3.3 Transformation function effect
Table 2 compares the number of unique basis under DD, GD
using Hamming with and without offset removal, and using
Reed-Solomon as transformation functions considering 2
real-wold data sets. In addition to the water dataset [1], we
use energy measurements from private households [2, 5]
using readings spanning a 6-month time span.1
We applied DD and GD over the columns on byte level. Ta-
ble 2 shows that the number of unique bases for GD is lower
than the one for DD for all the schemes which means that
the number of matches for GD is greater than the number of
matches for DD for both datasets. GD based on Hamming
with offset removal has reduced the number of unique bases
by up to 35% for water meter measurements.
4 HERMES ARCHITECTURE
Assumptions. In order to design and deploy a distributed net-
work using Hermes, we assume the following: (1) all nodes
use the same fingerprint length; (2) all generalized dedu-
plication nodes use the same transformation configuration;
and (3) all deduplication node use the same chunk length, to
avoid the need for transmitting the fingerprint/chunk length
and the transformation configuration in the network.
1From 01.07.2012 until 31.01.2013.
CC-BY 4.0. This is the author’s preprint version of the camera-ready article. A shorter version of this paper is published in the
proceedings of 14th ACM International Conference on Distributed and Event-Based Systems (DEBS 2020).
Table 2: Number of bases for real-world data sets.
Water meter measurements Electricity consumption & occupancy
# Bases # Bases
nB # Chunks DD
GD
Hamming
GD
Hamming
offset rem.1
GD
RS2
# Chunks DD GDHamming
GD
Hamming
offset rem.1
GD
RS2
32 8,062,520 535,959 516,455 488,738 485,714 20,909,713 9,971,873 9,933,732 9,407,828 9,898,888
64 4,031,260 539,377 537,689 499,233 537,010 10,454,862 5,437,915 5,428,332 5,246,798 5,425,244
128 2,015,630 335,678 334,244 269,619 334,877 5,227,436 2,920,964 2,916,975 2,852,228 2,918,966
256 1,007,815 260,276 259,720 168,140 260,5343 2,613,721 1,560,935 1,558,771 1,532,526 1,557,2943
512 503,908 153,245 153,118 121,073 - 1,306,867 832,608 831,308 821,580 -
1024 251,954 90,636 90,586 67,188 - 653,533 446,218 445,060 442,070 -
1 With preprocessing step of offset removal. 2 RS256(nB ,nB − 2). 3 RS256(255, 253).
Table 3: Message types for the Hermes protocol and re-
lation with the node classes.
Message Type basic dedup. gen. dedup.
Response ✓ ✓ ✓
Data ✓
Deduplication ✗ ✓ ✗
Deduplication data ✗ ✓ ✗
Gen. deduplication ✗ ✗ ✓
Gen. deduplication data ✗ ✗ ✓
A distributed deployment of Hermes allows for different
types of nodes: source, sink and intermediate nodes.
Source nodes inject data into the network, while sink
nodes only ingest data without further retransmissions. An
intermediate node is any node between a sink and source.
Each node handles messages according to its own (unique)
class: basic, deduplication and generalized deduplication.
Basic nodes serve as a pass-through, without any data
processing. Deduplication nodes perform DD on the node.
Finally, a generalized deduplication node performs GD lo-
cally. Depending on its type, a node handles different kinds of
messages, as shown in Table 3. All nodes can send response
messages, used to communicate success, acknowledgement
or failures in the system to the previous node in the commu-
nication chain. Basic nodes acting as source can only send
raw data using the data message type.
A deduplication node can send two types of messages,
(1) a deduplication message with the chunk finger, and (2) a
deduplication data message, which piggyback the fingerprint
and the chunk itself, when the latter is missing in the system.
A similar pattern is used for generalised deduplication
nodes. Initially, a first deduplication message is send, with
the fingerprint of a basis and the deviation.
If the basis is missing in the system, the node sends a
deduplication datamessage, including the fingerprint and the
chunk. If a deduplication or generalized deduplication node
Source Intermediate Sink
md
mack
mдd
mnf
mдdd
mack
Figure 3: Data transmission from a basic source
through a generalised deduplication intermediate to
a generalised deduplication sink.
receives a data message, they process the message payload
using DD or GD, according to their node’s type.
To invoke the transmission of (generalised) deduplication
data message, a node receiving the message must respond
with a new fingerprint message as this tells the sending node
that it is a basis fingerprint that has not been seen before.
Figure 3 illustrates the transmission of messages between
Hermes nodes with a simple 3-nodes topology. The interme-
diate and sink nodes use generalized deduplication.
The source sends a data message (md ) to the intermedi-
ate node. Upon reception, the intermediate replies with an
acknowledgement (mack ).
The intermediate node, using GD on the message payload,
will construct a generalized deduplication message (mдd )
and send it to the sink node. The sink node detects a new
fingerprint and responds with the corresponding response
message (mnf ). In turn, this triggers the intermediate node
to send a generalized deduplication data message (mдdd ), to
which the sink will respond with anmack .
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Apart from the computational resources needed to operate
GD or DD, nodes must maintain locally a record of seen
fingerprints. Here we keep a continuously growing record
of fingerprints in memory. The memory cost for a single
chunk/basis record is | f inдerprint | in bytes plus 8 bytes
used for data referencing; we call this costm. From this, the
total number of chunks/bases we can represent in n MB of
memory can be computed as n ·220m . Using CRC-32 hashes as
fingerprints this gives us that in 256MB of memory, we can
represent 22,369,621 fingerprints.
Security considerations.
An attacker can inject (generalised) deduplication data
messages where the fingerprint fi is not correct for the basis
or chunk in the message, potentially corrupting the data in
the system. If such as message is the first for the given fi
the data in system will be corrupt. A possible mitigation
strategy is to use validation checks, where a fingerprint f ′i
is generated for the chunk or basis and the validation will
be: if fi = f ′i then fi is valid else fi is invalid. If the result
is invalid the message should be rejected and the sender
of the message could be excluded from the network. Notice
however that this attack can be launched also against systems
using classical deduplication techniques.
Implementation details. The current implementation
for Hermes protocol supports GD-vanilla and GD-reduced.
We are considering GD-vanilla throughout this paper unless
otherwise stated. The Hermes protocol implementation re-
quires support for C++ 2017, is therefore linked against GNU
C++ library 6.0.25, and consists of 2394 LOC.
5 EVALUATION
This section presents our experimental evaluation of theHer-
mes prototype. Given the intricacies of obtaining accurate
power measurements on IoT devices, we begin by describ-
ing our experimental and measurement setup. Finally we
present our results based on micro-benchmarks and macro-
benchmarks on synthetic datasets.
5.1 Testbed
Our experiments are deployed over a switched cluster of
16 Raspberry Pi 4B2 featuring a Raspberry Pi PoE-HAT3 to
enable 802.3af Power-over-Ethernet [21].
We deploy a simple network topology where Raspberry
Pis are used as source nodes and are connected to a Dell Pow-
erEdge R330 server acting as sink node. The Raspberry Pis
are powered using PoE by an Ubiquiti Networks UniFi USW-
48P-750 switch and are connected over a Gigabit Ethernet
link.
2https://www.raspberrypi.org/products/raspberry-pi-4-model-b/
3https://www.raspberrypi.org/products/poe-hat/
Each Raspberry Pi is running the beta bootloader 2019-
12-03 and Raspian Buster Lite (2020-02-13) with a Linux
(v4.19.97) which are installed on a 32GiB SanDisk Extreme
microSDXC UHS-I card.
The clocks of all machines used during the benchmarks
are synchronized using NTP in order to relate the power
consumption to the statistics of a benchmark run.
5.2 Power Measurements
The power measurements are gathered using two techniques.
PowerSpy2. The Alciom PowerSpy24 is a power analyzer
connected between a power plug and a power adapter. It
supports two modes: (1) data logging, and (2) real-time.
The former produces periodicmeasurements that are stored
in the internal persistent memory and can later be fetched
and analyzed. The latter allows the device to stream periodic
measurements over Bluetooth v2.
We configure the PowerSpy in real-time mode to record
measurements at a frequency of 50Hz (i.e., one new sample
is produced every 0.02 s.
UniFi Switch.
The UniFi switch provides an access protected API reach-
able over a local telnet connection that can be used to query
the PoE status of its ports. We exploit this option to periodi-
cally gather PoE measurements on the utilized ports using
an ad-hoc expect script5.
With this method our script is able to record PoE infor-
mation at a frequency of about 8Hz. We point out that the
switch can sometimes detect the PoE state wrongly, i.e., a
device is connected but detected by the switch as an open
circuit or unknown state. In these situations the switch does
not provide any PoE status information and the power con-
sumption is not measured.
Reduction of interferences. During the execution of
the micro-benchmark the Raspberry Pi is attached to the
PowerSpy. With an auxiliary machine we connect simultane-
ously to the Raspberry Pi for monitoring and to the PowerSpy
for recording power measurements. We interface with the
Raspberry Pi via a serial channel (USB-to-UART). We em-
ploy UART in order to keep the static power consumption
of the Raspberry Pi as low as possible and to avoid power
interference from other peripherals. Hence, no peripherals
were attached to the Raspberry Pi except for Ethernet and
the UART GPIO pins.
Additionally, several system services (e.g., cron, ssh, timesyncd,
etc.) are disabled for the micro-benchmark to avoid interfer-
ence from other processes during the measurement.
4https://www.alciom.com/en/our-trades/products/powerspy2/
5https://core.tcl-lang.org/expect/index
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Figure 5: Micro-benchmark on Raspberry Pi 4B.
5.3 Classic vs. Generalized Deduplication
First we demonstrate the impact a data set with certain prop-
erties can have on classic and generalized deduplication.
More specifically we analyze the impact of repetitive chunks
and the number of chunks mapping to a basis.
We will show our best case scenario using synthetic data
sets. Let us consider Hamming codes as the transformation
function. Then, all chunks which are 1 bit away from an
error-free codeword (our basis) will be mapped to the same
basis. Given this fact, we generate data sets for each chunk
length of nB = ⌈ 2m8 ⌉ individually, as follows. First, we gener-
ate random error-free codewords. Then, for each error-free
codeword, we generate chunks which are 1 bit away from it.
Our generator for the synthetic data set can be parame-
terized to create a specific number of (unique) bases and to
derive a specific number of (unique) chunks. A basis can be
easily generated by selecting a random number of length
k bits. The error-free codeword is made by encoding the
basis. Chunks can then be derived by flipping a random bit
and testing that the newly created chunk maps to the same
basis.
With generalized deduplication data chunks aremapped to
basis. The ratio of chunks to basis for consecutive numbers
of parity bits is depicted in Figure 4a and given in nepes.
As the number of parity bits increases (and therefore also
the chunk size), so do the number of chunks mapping to a
basis. Consequently the compression ratio increases with
the number of parity bits.
Figure 6 compares the compression ratio of our technique
based on GD with two standard compression algorithms,
DEFLATE and LZW, considering the synthetic data sets. We
consider CRC32 to generate the fingerprints. We apply all
the schemes on each chunk individually. Figure 6 shows
neither DEFLATE nor LZW compress the data (compression
ratio is lower than 1). For larger chunk lengths, DD slightly
compress the data. That is while GD compresses the data
significantly after the chunk length of 8 B. GD provides a
compression ratio of 334 and 668 for chunk lengths of 2048
and 4096 bytes, respectively. Compression ratio for DD is
only 1.58 for chunk lengths of 2048 and 4096 bytes.
Data sets with a lot of repetitive chunks are favored by
DD over GD as can be seen for multiple repetitions of the
full set of 2 B chunks in Figure 4b. Although GD is capable of
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Figure 6: Compression ratio under different schemes us-
ing synthetic data sets.
mapping multiple chunks to a basis compared to DD, GD also
has to store the deviation of a chunk to its basis. The infor-
mation held by the deviation results in an additional storage
requirement for GD and is thus an unfavored characteristic
of a data set.
The last property we mention is the number of unique
chunks per basis. The number of unique chunks mapping to
a basis increases with the chunk size as previously shown
in Figure 4a. In Figure 4c we demonstrate the different stor-
age requirements for DD and GD for a data set of a little more
than a million chunks. By gradually increasing the number
of unique chunks, we see that GD can map more chunks to
a basis and achieves a better compression ratio.
5.4 Micro-benchmark
Our set of micro-benchmarks are shown in Figure 5, using
the previously described synthetic datasets. We show the
different trade-offs in terms of chunk-size, energy per bit,
compression ratio and throughput. Results show that energy
per bit performance of GD is comparable to DD even con-
sidering the added transformation computation. For chunk
sizes of 8 bytes and above, GD not only compresses the data,
but it does so significantly better than DD. For chunks of 64
bytes, GD requires an order of magnitude fewer bits than
for DD to represent the data. For chunks of 4096 bytes, GD
outperforms DD by three orders of magnitude. This is due to
the large number of chunks matched to each basis. Finally,
the achieved throughput maxes out at 30+ Mbps for a single
thread. We have considered all the operations to measure
this throughput. These operations include reading the data
from memory, applying the compression algorithm and look-
ing for fingerprints in memory to check the availability of
the fingerprint for DD and GD. In a real world scenario, a
source node only needs to apply the compression algorithm
and it is the sink node which looks for the fingerprint. Thus,
we expect a higher throughput in real deployments. Future
work will consider using NEON instruction sets in ARM to
speed up processing.
5.5 Macro-benchmark
In the macro-benchmark, we present the combined statistics
for the Raspberry Pi cluster.We evaluate three different trans-
mission methods: raw, DD and GD. By raw, we designate
sending raw data chunks. Although our prototype implemen-
tation has multi-threading capability, we decided to use only
two threads to be comparable to the micro-benchmark. We
use one thread to handle the networking and a second thread
to do the necessary transformations and look-ups. Figure 7a
shows that for smaller chunks the energy is higher. This is
due to the inaccuracy of the measurement done with the
UniFi switch. The switch has a much lower time resolution
to update the PoE status statistics, which we observed to be
around 4 to 5 seconds. With large chunk sizes (larger than
typical IoT ones), the energy also increases for GD. What is
most important, is that the network traffic generated for the
different methods in Figure 7b is reduced significantly with
GD. As seen in the micro-benchmark, the macro-benchmark
also shows an optimal throughput between 4 and 12 parity
bits. Approaching 1024 KiB, we recognize a significant drop
in throughput for GD. We assume this is due to hardware
limitations, like exceeding cache limits.
6 RELATEDWORK
A large number of lossy and lossless compression techniques
have been proposed in the literature to reduce the data
transmission by source nodes. Lossy strategies for compress-
ing across multiple data sources, such as compressive sens-
ing [7, 17, 20], error correcting codes to achieve distributed
source coding [12, 14, 28], usually provide high data com-
pression at the cost of introducing some distortion (losses,
errors) at the time of reconstruction of the data. However, for
many IoT applications, such as smart metering or industrial
sensing, errors are not acceptable. These applications usually
rely on a combination of standard compression algorithms
applied to a packet-by-packet basis and delta compression
within the same packet. Applying standard compressors to
small data limits their compression potential. Given the lim-
ited computing and memory capabilities of most IoT devices,
these devices rely on simpler algorithms (e.g., LZW) rather
than more advanced but more computationally and memory
intensive ones (e.g., DEFLATE [11], 7z [26]).
Deduplication (DD) is used widely to reduce both storage
and transmission cost [27]. Applying DD at the sink node
reduces the storage cost by removing equal chunks or files,
an approach usually called target-based [16]. Instead, when
applied at the source node, i.e., source-based approach [16],
DD reduces simultaneously both storage and transmission
cost.
Cross-user deduplication helps to reduce the storage cost
further by deduplicating data over all the users’ data. It has
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Figure 7: Macro-benchmark on Raspberry Pi 4B cluster.
serious security implications due to deterministic status re-
sponse to the existence of a chunk [16]. To solve this issue,
a wide range of approaches have been proposed [15, 27, 38].
However, all these solution generally suffer from high com-
putational complexity and/or negatively impact the compres-
sion rate.
In contrast to DD, source-based, cross-user GD does not
provide a deterministic response regarding availability of a
chunk. GD expands a chunk into a basis and a deviation to
increase the hit probability into previously received bases.
For example, using Hamming as the transformation function
for GD and for chunk length of 1KB, there exist 8192 differ-
ent chunks mapped to each basis. The number of possible
chunks increases when considering Reed-Solomon as the
transformation function.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
This work proposed and evaluated a new protocol (Hermes)
for data compression acrossmultiple sources using the emerg-
ing concept of generalized deduplication. GD generalizes the
concept of deduplication by introducing a systematic, trans-
formation stage that allows us to cluster similar data without
the need to compare it to a pool of values (as in Delta encod-
ing) or using similarity fingerprints.
We have shown that Hermes allows the system to reach
significant benefits in compression of the data and reduc-
ing data transmission without loss. We achieve this with a
small added computational overhead as shown in deploy-
ments with Raspberry Pi model 4B. This evaluation was
carried out considering different data chunk sizes and trans-
formation functions for GD. For small data packets, our eval-
uations show that GD significantly outperforms standard
compression approaches used in IoT scenarios, e.g., LZW,
and even more computationally intensive approaches such
as DEFLATE. Additionally, we demonstrated that Hermes
under ideal conditions can provide orders of magnitude bet-
ter compression than DD and even LZW/DEFLATE (on a
packet by packet basis) given GD’s ability to automatically
identify similar data. Finally, we contributed with new and
efficient strategies of GD that advance the theoretical work
in [37] to address practical considerations and reduce some
overheads in GD compared to DD.
Future work will focus on developing transformations
that are more data-aware (e.g., dynamically choosing trans-
formations) to enhance overall compression or system per-
formance. We will also focus on carrying out large-scale
deployments of Hermes, potentially considering more com-
putationally limited devices, e.g., Arduinos. Finally, we will
enhance Hermes to allow its operation over unreliable trans-
port protocols, e.g., UDP, expanding its capability ranging
from packet loss correction and management, even consider-
ing a joint design with forward error correction techniques
and network coding [36], to congestion control.
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